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RESUMEn. El objetivo de este artículo es estudiar
la teoría del espacio interior del cuerpo de Maine
de Biran a lo largo de sus tres componentes
principales que son establecidos a lo largo de un
diálogo crítico con Condillac y Destutt de Tracy,
y desarrollados desde el punto de vista de la te-
oría del esfuerzo. Esos componentes son: la du-
rabilidad del esfuerzo primordial; la posibilidad
de percibir el espacio exterior; la consistencia
del tiempo furtivo de la sensibilidad.
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ABSTRACT. The aim of this paper is to study
Maine de Biran’s theory of interior space along
its three major components, established along
a critical dialogue with Condillac and Destutt
de Tracy, and developed from the theory of ef-
fort’s point of view. Those components are: the
durability of the primordial effort; the possi-
bility of perceiving exterior space; the consis-
tency of the furtive time of sensibility. 
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1. The primordial fact
Is what we can learn of the complex or-
ganization of the brain and the central ner-
vous system in any way analogous to what
we can know of ourselves when actively
exercising our faculties of thought, mem-
ory, attention, and perception? Is the
anatomical construction or quality of the
fibres that transmit nociceptive messages
from the epidermis to the spinal cord at all
similar to the individualized meaning of
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what affects us (as “pain”, for example)?
Is it possible to equate an explainable
physiological body with a body that is ap-
perceived? 
The spirit – if not the letter – of this
questioning can be traced back to how
Maine de Biran (1766-1824) confronted
the epistemological options pursued by
the emergent Science of Man of his time.
In fact, Biran’s philosophy represents a
fundamental critique of attempts to trans-
pose the methodologies of the sciences of
nature to the study of what is human in
man. It is, in a way, a critique of a certain
air du temps – of fascination with an epis-
teme that is based on the primacy of exte-
rior representation and, consequently, re-
mains intoxicated by the dream of an
integral experimental cartography of the
human way of being. In such a transposi-
tion, under pressure from the methodolo-
gies of the sciences of nature, physiology
occupies the study of man by trying to re-
duce interior, non-representable evidence
to exterior, readable data (an option that
remains live in the paradigm of biological
naturalism under which we live today).
According to Biran, this is a misguided ap-
proach, and in it the philosopher from
Bergerac diagnoses a symptom of the
crises of the sciences: in his view, this
transposition brings with it the danger of
epistemological standardization and, as a
consequence, the peril of losing sight, on
the side of the study of man, of the differ-
ent kinds of phenomena that this complex
reality entails. How can a science about
man begin by ignoring what only someone
who has de immediate felling of himself
and is able to communicate immediately
with his own thought can know about be-
ing human? How can such a science be
built without asking how man comes to
know himself (in that state of conscium, or
compos sui,1 without which nothing can be
known) in the first place? 
This does not mean that science is of
no use to the study of man; far from Biran
to sustain such a view. What he is arguing
is that in order to do justice to the com-
plexity of the human way of being, the sci-
ence of man must recognise differences.
We must, of course, try to know objec-
tively (physiologically, neurologically,
anatomically, biologically, medically), for
example, “what an impression, a move-
ment, a perception”, a thought, a feeling,
or, say, a pain is; nonetheless, what we
cannot forget or ignore is that this kind of
scientific approach will remain without
rigor and without a true foundation if it ig-
nores the necessity of first determining
“how an impression is experienced, how
an idea is thought, how a subject is possi-
ble”,2 how pain is lived. This is a crucial
point: there are certain kinds of facts (in-
terior ones) that can only be considered
(better yet: that only occur) if the subject
of knowledge identifies himself “with the
active and consistently productive force of
such acts, with the I that feels or apper-
ceives itself in those operations”.3 That is
to say, when we deal with the specificity
of what is specifically human in human
beings, to be “scientific” is not just to ex-
plain what can be “generalized” or objec-
tified from “an exterior point of view”; it
is also to make space for the subjectivity
of an interior and individualized point of
view4 on oneself, as opposed to the knowl-
edge that one can establish from a per-
spective outside of oneself. 
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Ignoring this, according to Biran, comes
with consequences, the first being that it
becomes no longer necessary to describe
ontogenesis: to describe how thought is
born in a thinking being, how sensation, at-
tention, perception begins in a sensitive, at-
tentive, perceptive being. As P. Montebello
has shown, Husserl, a century after Biran,
would argue something similar, also de-
nouncing the crises of European sciences
and their symptoms, such as the blind option
of searching for supposed exact idealities
without reflecting on their genesis. What Bi-
ran identifies as the reduction of psychology
to physics (physiology), and what Husserl
calls the ‘psychologism’, ‘historicism’, and
‘logicism’ of the ego5 represent the same
concealment of the origins of meaning, the
same disguising of the original way in
which thought becomes present (of how
thought is born for me), the same attempt to
erase the limits of any analogical investiga-
tion into subjectivity. 
It is with his famous theory of primordial
effort that Biran, in turn, faces this funda-
mental demand. The primordial effort is, for
Maine de Biran, the primitive inner relation
(established by the active force of the will
and the interior resistance of a muscular,
consistent body) where the first fact we can
ever know6 is established: the fact of con-
sciousness, the beginning of thought, the in-
timate evidence of the I.7 This is, as is well
known, a central thesis of Biran’s philoso-
phy: the I can be identified with the active
force we call will only insofar as the exis-
tence of that force becomes a fact that occurs
in a non-representable relational act; and this
perseverant act can occur only if that force of
will is applied to a consistent inner term that
is the interior resistance of the body.8
This is a revolutionary and elegant
principle with radical philosophical im-
plications, one of which is to offer a solu-
tion to the problem of the beginning of
consciousness, of the thinking self, that
short-circuits traditional dualisms by
means of an active primordial duality – a
duality where two terms, distinct but never
separated,9 produce the embodied10 ap-
perceptive unity of a subjective relational
I (the basis for a rigorous “interior” theory
of faculties and emotions). In this way, Bi-
ran’s theory of effort reveals that the ap-
perceived I is not a thing, an organ, or set
of organs, a readable or exterior location,
but rather a subjective perspective – on
oneself, life, and the world – that, because
it depends on a non-representable way of
appearing of a “interior” resistant body, is
an embodied act. 
It is to account for this inner resisting
own body (corps propre) that Biran intro-
duces the original idea of an interior space
(espace intérieur).The first formulation of
this idea can be found in the notes Biran
took when revising the prize-winning ver-
sion of his Mémoire sur la décomposition
de la pensée, and its aim was to introduce
a subtle conceptual clarification in his
work: the idea that the unity of the inner
resisting body of the primordial effort11
(effort primitive) is a kind of continuity of
resistance (continuité de résistence).12
2. A spacious body without image
and the ways of interior active touch
Biran finds the expression resistentis con-
tinuatio in Leibniz’s definition of material
and objective extension, but for the French
philosopher the expression seems particu-
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larly adequate to express something dif-
ferent: a kind of interior extension or in-
terior space inherent in the apperceptive
primitive duality of effort. needless to
say, the interior space of which Biran
speaks is not the provisory interior space
of the objective body that disappears un-
der the surgeon’s scalpel. That imperma-
nent physical extension is, in fact, an ex-
terior space. The muscular inner
continuous resistance of the body in the
primordial effort is, on the contrary, an
enduring subjective certainty that has no
image because it is given with the fact of
consciousness itself – and therefore must
be distinguished from the body studied
by anatomy and physiology. Biran states
this clearly in an interesting anticipation of
contemporary phenomenology (equally
acknowledge by Merleau-Ponty, J. Pa-
točka, M. Henry or P. Ricoeur, among
other).
The I cannot exist to itself without the
feeling or the immediate inner apper-
ception of the coexistence of the body:
this is the primordial fact. But it can
exist or have such an apperception wi-
thout already knowing its body as an
object of representation.13
The larger philosophical context of
this argument is important: it takes place
in a critical dialogue with Condillac and
Desttut de Tracy regarding the question of
how we can know our bodies as such.
Condillac’s “ingenious hypothesis”,
illustrated by his famous statue, was to
tackle the question starting from the ex-
perience of “double touch”, understood
as the origin of our judgements of exte-
riority: if the statue feels some pressure
against the touching hand with no second
sensation it is possible to conclude that it
is touching a foreign body; but when the
placing of the hand against the chest oc-
curs, whereby one has two feelings, one
in the hand, the other in the chest, what
also happens is that while touching its
chest, the statue can “locate its I, both in
its chest and in its hand”.14 The difficulty
here is to explain how we can be sure that
we are perceiving our own bodies.
Condillac’s solution is to contend that
one sort of sensation, conveyed by the
hand, offers a necessary sensible “con-
tinuous” replica of the body as our own.
In short, this depends on the hand’s being
capable of active touch, of being moved
over the surface of a sensible body; more-
over, there must be a sensation of con-
tinual resistance between the chest and
the hand, a kind of tactual perception that
provides kinaesthetic awareness of the
body as “my” own. In a certain sense,
along the sensible extension constantly15
being touched, the statue will finally feel,
“so to speak, under its hand, the continu-
ity of the I”.16
For Maine de Biran, this solution’s
weakness and lack of depth are evident:
Condillac makes “sensation” both the ob-
jective basis of sensation and, at the same
time, the subjective basis of the I;17 by
doing so, according to Biran, he promotes
an unsustainable confusion of points of
view and equivocally subverts the order of
knowledge by supposing that the embod-
ied continuity of the I could have been
“known” before that “I” was born. But
what would be the sense of something
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like an incessant touching or a succession
of acts of touching parts of a body, if a
constant I was not primordially known in
its perseverant, durable and consistent ap-
perception? How can any voluntary in-
tentional effort of movement even be con-
ceivable or fulfilled in time without the
temporal density of an immanent and in-
trinsically active point fixe – that offered
by an unintentional18 primordial effort? 
Condillac’s analysis was to be con-
tested by Destutt de Tracy, and there is a
moment when Biran thinks his master and
friend might finally point out the true path.
Tracy disagrees with Condillac’s asser-
tion that the hand is the main “organ of
touch”.19 This is not a minor disagree-
ment: Tracy contends that one must dis-
tinguish between the pressure or surface
felt against the hand and the more funda-
mental sensation of movement, or of vol-
untarily moving one’s body. Without the
willed movement of the percipient, Tracy
argues, there would be no perception of
space or body. We can imagine Biran’s
enthusiasm as he read Tracy’s argument,
according to which we must understand
that, prior to feeling something against
my hand, an internally experienced vol-
untary motility (motilité) connected with
the voluntary muscles of the body is re-
quired. He is talking about “effort”, it
seems. But Tracy is not Biran, and the lat-
ter quickly understands that Tracy20 only
appears to be criticising Condillac or of-
fering an alternative. 
According to Biran, it becomes cru-
cially evident in Elements d’idéologie that
for Tracy, in the most primordial layer of
analysis of voluntary movement, what is
first true is that “we do not distinguish ei-
ther exterior bodies or our own body”,21
even if by the sentiment de resistance we
are certain that “we exist and that some-
thing else that is different from us exists
too”.22 In fact, Tracy simply repeats
Condillac’s principles. They both work
with the same acritical principles: that my
“own” body only resists like the exterior
bodies, that there is only one kind of re-
sistance (exterior), one kind of voluntary
movement or effort (the exteriorly ob-
servable kind), only one kind of body (one
forced to coincide with its sensible sur-
face), only one source of evidence (seen,
touchable exterior things) and, conse-
quently, only one kind of space: an exte-
rior space conceived as a contiguity and
traversed by exterior movements of “de-
sire”.23 But once again: how is Condil-
lac’s movable touch, or Tracy’s motility,
even conceivable before or independently
of a primordial apperceptive effort? 
It is this necessary architectonic level
of analysis that both Condillac and Tracy
misinterpret. Had they pursued that kind
of research, according to Biran, their doc-
trines would be quite different: they could
have found another kind of resistance (an
inner resistance of the body), another
“kind” of body (a body without image),
another kind of evidence (the evidence of
the interior point of view) and, once
again, last but not least, another kind of
space: an interior space that is the conti-
nuity of inner bodily resistance and, in
this sense, clearly distinct from exterior
space. And this would be crucial: accord-
ing to Biran, only the interior space of the
body – the unity of an interior continuous
resistance (and not the exterior resistance
of a bodily surface), the spacious non-
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representable resistance of the body of
immediate apperception – undivided and
constant, instantaneous and durable, mas-
sive and docile, gives consistency, unity
and durability to the “fundamental feeling
or (…) apperception of existing”.24 This is
the basic condition of an exterior moving
(perceptive) touch;25 in other words, no
exterior space would even be conceiv-
able without the primordial fixed refer-
ence offered by the primitive effort, and
consequently, without what gives that ef-
fort consistency: the inner spatial resis-
tance of the body that is instantaneously
crossed by the perseverant, durable “in-
terior active touch”26 that is primordial
apperception.
The “very notable difference”27 be-
tween an exterior resistance that “anni-
hilates the effect of motor impulsion, that
suspends or detains the movement deter-
mined by the will”, and the interior re-
sistance that “obeys or gives in each time
the effort that constitutes the I”28 be-
comes “essential”:29 the interior space
has no image30 or exterior figurations;31
it is not a “container” that is visible or
touchable from the outside, but nor is it a
kind of introspectively accessible con-
tainer of “personal feelings”. It is what
sustains the duration of the conscious or
apperceptive I. In other words, the time32
or durée33 of the awakened I is, primor-
dially, a way of taking inner space that,
being a continuity of resistance, guar-
anties the duration of an instantaneous
primordial effort. To say I, according to
Biran, is then not to sustain any kind of
self-centred idealism or the idea of an
innate apodictic I; it is simply to take up
space, one’s own interior space.
3. A spacious resonant body and the
ways of affective touch
The conclusion that to perceive exterior
space one must first be an interior resistant
space also means that no external refer-
ences34 are required to apperceive it; all
that is needed is the interior active touch
(toucher intérieur actif). In this sense, the
space Biran is talking about is the em-
blem of the presence of the body in the un-
intentional effort. In a way, this kind of in-
terior space corresponds to the embodied
density of the awakened I and can be inti-
mately sensed even when “the sense of vi-
sion is veiled in the darkness usque in
spissi tenebris, the sense of touch in the
absence of any accidental pressure, the
sense of hearing in silence, etc.”35 In this
situation we are like the paraplegic de-
scribed by Rey Régis, who, unable to ex-
ercise a particular effort on the sensible
parts affected by sensible impressions (for
example when someone presses one of
his fingers), continues to feel pain (be-
cause in this condition, we are still our-
selves in the interior resistance of the
body) without apperceiving where: the
pain is, in a sense, everywhere.36
But this is not all. Something more
must be said because even if the idea of a
continuity of resistance is Biran’ first word
on the subject of interior space, it is not his
last. The interior space is not simply that
inner consistent endurance of the apper-
ceptive effort: “the interior space of the
own body”, argues Biran, “is also the
place of affective impressions felt by the
individual.37 Biran is dealing here with
what we could call today a “phenomeno-
logical dimension of bodily self-aware-
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ness”38 that is pushed to its limits and,
there, finds the multi-stratified comple-
xity of our embodied way of being. Those
impressions from our sensibility remain, at
their most archaic levels, merged in what
Biran calls “the confused sentiment of the
absolute general life” of the “organiza-
tion”. But sometimes they can also “as-
sume the form of relation as they unite by
simple coincidence with the effort or the
I”,39 in this case forming “compound sen-
sations” that can be localized40 in the re-
sisting body in several ways.41 This is to
say that the primordial effort is due to be
complicated by “variable or accidental
impressions” of an affective and intuitive
sensibility that can constantly haunt and
derange the life of apperceptive effort (la
vie de relation).42 In these circumstances,
the interior space – first known as vague
and unlimited, dense and coexistent (to
will), full and continuous, docile and per-
severant – is suddenly perceived as varia-
ble and manifold, as circumscribed by
many different intensities and rhythms
when sensible impressions combine with
a repetitive and intentional, or “particular
effort”.43 In those coincidental combina-
tions, it is possible to locate (touching an
injury repeatedly, repeatedly acknowled-
ging a pain in the chest by deep breathing)
“points of separation” on the continuum
resistencis.44
Here, it all depends on a coincidental
encounter, at a single point of the interior
space, between the duality of effort and
the materiality of affective and intuitive
sensibility, as if the resisting body were a
multi-stratified inner place, an interior
spatial interface that gives density to all
layers of our own vie subjective. In this
case, we are no longer in the situation of
the paraplegic described by Rey Régis:
I sense a pain in one foot, or in a mobile
part of my body, I have the very distinct
feeling of the existence of that part as
the term of a voluntary effort, indepen-
dently of the accidental impression that
I perceive as I report it, while not fee-
ling another interior part of my body,
over which the will does not act except
when accidentally affected.45
This is a crucial passage: to begin with,
Biran points out that our subjective life is
not only the apperceptive evidence of the
primordial effort: to be myself is not
merely to be an I; it is also to be the ap-
perception of what affects me. What this
means is that the unity of the I, though be-
ginning with the effort, is never truly pro-
tected from the influences of the world
and the amalgamations of life. What is
uncanny here is that, on the one hand, we
must distinguish between the appercep-
tive relational I and the “materials” of sen-
sibility the I does not “cause” or origi-
nate; but on the other hand, it is still me
that feels, and so it must be concluded
that sensibility somehow combines with
apperception. We must conclude, then,
that the capacity of being a subject,46 of
having a life of relation and conscious-
ness, involves not merely persevering in
the primordial effort but also becoming
more and more individualized by the inte-
rior difference, distinctiveness, of all that
happens in me. 
The coincidence of a repeated effort
with certain organic points unfolds an ex-
cess of the body: the excess of the body I
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am in relation to body of the effort. This
surplus of the body remains the emblem of
an interior embodied space that not only is
moved as an element of the primordial
duality of effort but also vibrates to the
rhythms of all that affects me (within me
or outside of me). When the I is “united with
affections they make it say that it feels, with
intuitions that it perceives.”47 We must
then conclude that interior space is always
caught by sensibility. In this sense, such a
space is, in fact, a multi-stratified conti-
nuity of inner consistency: the continuity
of resistance inherent in the primordial
effort (the apperceptive evidence of the
conscious I) and also a kind of inner ex-
tension – “compound and multiple”48 – or
a spacious unpresentable volume that den-
sifies all the distinctions, movements, in-
tensities and layers of subjective life. To
locate a sensation (the first type of com-
position: the effort with the materials of
affection) is therefore at the same time to
experience what I am, and what is felt by
me without being the effort or the I:49 I feel
a round or pointed pain, a cold or hot pain,
a pain that expands or travels within me; I
suffer melancholically the shrinking of
my body, the enclosure of myself. 
The multi-stratification of the interior
space becomes clearer. In fact, something
of an inner heterogeneity unfolds in that
interior continuous ground: as if the inner
volume of subjective life included an in-
ner exterior of the apperceptive I at the
centre of our subjective life. That hetero-
geneity would signal in my subjective life
the “presence of an affective or intuitive
matter that the I does not create, but rather
follows in motion, in more or less active
tension”.50 Maybe this is why Maine de
Biran suggests, in a telling and much-
studied51 passage from Note sur l’idée
d’existence, that the sentiment d’existence, 
[t]hat kind of vague and obscure fee-
ling, connected to all and every mode
of animal or organic life, does not dif-
fer in the animal man from the mode of
existence or presence of the extension
of his own body.52
And he adds, a couple of paragraphs
later:
Apart from any activity of the human
person and due only to the impressive-
ness of his life, there will be for the ani-
mal man what I call immediate intui-
tion of his own body.53
This is a surprising but central claim for
two major reasons: first of all, because
when Biran talks about the way we feel
our existence, he is often talking about what
causes that feeling to be unstable: the reper-
cussions of the savage influence (on our
temperament and our humour, for example)
of pure affections (which remain imper-
sonal and impossible to know at their ori-
gins).54 A second problem arises regarding
intuition, a term Biran uses to refer to sim-
ple or objective exterior perception, which
gives us “existences outside ourselves” im-
mediately; the difficulty here is that intu-
ition works with exterior space and relies
on the persuasive power of images – some-
thing that, as we have seen, is not applica-
ble to interior space. What, then, is an im-
mediate (interior) intuition of the own
body? And why force in this way an anal-
ogy between exterior and interior space?55
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Let us look closely at intuition: if it is
what gives us “existence outside our-
selves”, intuition is about visual percep-
tion, but also exterior touch. Let us rela-
tivize the primacy of image in intuition
and – as A. Devarieux crucially proposes
– focus our attention on touch. In this
sense, an “immediate intuition” is an im-
mediate interior touch of something per-
ceived as exterior; in this case a kind of
“exteriority” of the interior space. Along
the interior active touch, we must then
suppose, is another kind of interior touch:
one that feels what affects us (without be-
ing I) as touchable. According to Biran,
we must then talk about an affective inner
touch56 (tact affective) that follows a new
kind of bodily continuity, of inner spa-
cious duration: the rhythms of the body I
am suddenly appearing as a landscape of
sensible relational intensities, moods, os-
cillations. 
According to Biran, the affective touch
can only be fully grasped if we graft into
the model of intuitive touch the model of
acoustic intuitions.57 To touch affectively
is, according to Biran, to hear not only
what touches us but, more archaically,
what touches itself in me, what resounds in
me from an “exterior” that is, in fact, an in-
terior of the interior. The interior space of
the body is, in its last stratification, a res-
onant space of “a body-pain, a body-
joy”58. If the sentiment d’existence can be
said to be the “feeling of the extension of
the own body”, that is because the imme-
diate intuition of that extension or space is
also an intuitive apprehension of an af-
fective durability or temporality: a musi-
cal touchable temporality of sensibility –
which the “barometer of the soul” mea-
sures each day, as if our bodies were to be
understood on the model of Biran’s
favourite musical instrument: the harp.
4. Final thoughts
The three major components of Main de
Biran’s theory of interior space – the dura-
bility of the effort, the possibility of per-
ceiving exterior space, and the consis-
tency of the furtive time of sensibility –
are a testament to Biran’s modernity. As P.
Montebello wrote in a recent paper, “Bi-
ran’s philosophy remains of interest to us
(…) “because we have not yet escaped
from the questions that it poses”59. One of
those questions has to do with the status of
philosophical question we must give con-
sciousness or apperception (or subjective
personal existence), which, according to
Biran cannot be reduced to anatomy and
physiology or grasped in any exterior
manifestation. The life of consciousness
with its unique apperceptive and phe-
nomenal order requires, in its originality,
a radically different method from the one
based on exterior observation: an internal
study of the inner spatialized acts of con-
sciousness as they envelop the body. 
Biran’s philosophical description of
the body is also a testament to his moder-
nity. The body apprehended here is not the
body of the anatomist (an objective exte-
rior body), nor that of the metaphysician
(an absolute substance); it is first and fore-
most that immediate and lived body
through which aperceptive consciousness
of oneself is given, sensations are situ-
ated, perceptions are constructed and af-
fections are suffered - as a primordial os-
cillation of something that, as M. Richir
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came to emphasize, can well be inside or
outside ourselves60.
Biran’s interest in the role of the body in
the genesis of thought (and the differentia-
tion of human faculties) led him to raise yet
another modern problem. He saw that con-
sciousness is always traversed by some-
thing that it does not create but that is im-
posed upon it61, forming unexpected (and,
for Biran, melancholic) new landscapes in
interior space. Biran thus developed a the-
ory of anonym, impersonal and potentially
alienating affectivity. There, he finds a
whole plane beneath consciousness, made
of spontaneous associations of affects, in-
tuitions, images and movements that form
an underground stream that frequently dis-
turbs, alters and agitates our general sense of
embodied existence. Between the certainty
of being oneself, found in effort, and the
bizarre evidence of not being just oneself or
always just in oneself, sensed in the distur-
bances of affectivity, Biran’s original ques-
tions can be translated into one major sim-
ple inquiry: what does it mean to think with
your body? Both the importance of this
question and Biran’s pioneer contributions
to an informed answer cannot be ignore.
They keep all their merits till this day.  
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